money and its effect on afghnistan

http://www.npr.org/2011/04/14/135412691/how-the-fall-troop-surge-changed-afghanistan

Mr. EXUM: You know, Rajiv is a hundred percent correct that you have to establish security. You have to establish a degree of control over the environment. And with all due respect to the caller, the idea that we can do good works, that we can build roads, that we can build schools, and that - this is going to somehow address drivers of conflict, that's unfortunately proven to be incorrect.

As a matter of fact, a lot of the money that we're putting into Afghanistan is distorting the conflict in Afghanistan and creating perverse incentives to where none of the actors - the insurgents, the government - has an interest in the United States leaving. What we have to do is establish some degree of security which then allows us to build up local Afghan forces, and that then sets the conditions for some sort of political settlement

Mr. EXUM: Look, the Pakistanis have been pursuing a pretty logical hygiene strategy since about 2005. As soon as we started to divert resources away from Afghanistan, the Pakistanis began to quite logically plan for a post-American, post-Western Afghanistan, and that meant reconstituting a lot of the proxy groups that would represent Pakistan's interests in a post-Western Afghanistan.

Afghan Schools

Khaled Hosseini writes that "If we accept the premise that education is the key to achieving positive, long lasting change in Afghanistan, then it is impossible to overstate how encouraging it is that this year[2009] nearly eight and a half million children will attend school in Afghanistan, with girls accounting for nearly 40% of enrollment."

"During the 1970s, the women of urban Afghanistan enjoyed a level of professional freedom and autonomy that was relatively liberal for a conservative Muslim society.  According to the US-Afghan Women's Council a significant percentage of the women in Kabul worked for a living-tens of thousands of them serving in medicine, law, journalism, engineering.

 .. in Kabul , unveiled females could be seen inside factories, and offices, t.v.  and walking the street wearing Eastern European style cloths.

The Taliban ended that.

..every woman was forbidden to go outside their homes, unless with a male relative, clad in a dark burka.  Any street or town with a female name was changed.

Women who were ill could only be treated by female doctors, but all women doctors were confined to their homes, and denied permission to go out.  severing half the pop access to health care.

The cities war widows, 50 thousand, had no way to earn a living, prostitution or begging and stealing, which if caught meant stoning or amputations

100,000 school girls were kicked out , and 8000 university students,  8000 teachers lost their jobs

“Andersonville! Andersonville!”

Henry Wirz, a Swiss doctor from Louisiana, served as prison commandant during the last few months of the camp’s existence after its original commandant, Brigadier General John Winder, died in February 1865. For his efforts, such as they were, Wirtz was hanged in November 1865. His last fourteen minutes of life were spent at the end of a rope that was too short, listening to Union soldiers taunt him with cries of “Andersonville! Andersonville!” as he slowly choked to death. Remarkably, he was the only Confederate official to be executed for war crimes.

Edge of the West

Dr. Watson Fights the Taliban (Sherlock Holmes)

    In the year 1878 I took my degree of Doctor of Medicine of the University of London, and proceeded to Netley to go through the course prescribed for surgeons in the Army. Having completed my studies there, I was duly attached to the Fifth Northumberland Fusiliers as assistant surgeon. The regiment was stationed in India at the time, and before I could join it, the second Afghan war had broken out. On landing at Bombay, I learned that my corps had advanced through the passes, and was already deep in the enemy's country. I followed, however, with many other officers who were in the same situation as myself, and succeeded in reaching Candahar in safety, where I found my regiment, and at once entered upon my new duties.

    The campaign brought honours and promotion to many, but for me it had nothing but misfortune and disaster. I was removed from my brigade and attached to the Berkshires, with whom I served at the fatal battle of Maiwand. There I was struck on the shoulder by a Jezail bullet, which shattered the bone and grazed the subclavian artery. I should have fallen into the hands of the murderous Ghazis had it not been for the devotion and courage shown by Murray, my orderly, who threw me across a packhorse, and succeeded in bringing me safely to the British lines.

Ghazis;   Muslims who fight non-Muslims.

"a Jezail bullet"


“The Jezailchis are so called from their jezails or long rifles. The Afghans are said to be among the best marksmen in the world. They are accustomed to arms from early boyhood, live in a chronic state of warfare with their neighbors, and are most skilful in taking advantage of cover. An Afghan will throw himself flat, behind a stone barely big enough to cover his head, and scoop a hollow in the ground with his left elbow as he loads. Men like these only require training to make first-rate irregular troops.” — General Colin Mackenzie 


The Battle of Maiwand was one of the principal battles of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The battle ended in defeat for the British Army and victory for the Afghan followers of Ayub Khan. The Afghan victory at Maiwand was at a cost of anywhere between 2,050 to 2,750 Afghan warriors killed and probably about 1,500 wounded.^[1] On the other side, about 969 British/Indian soldiers were killed and 177 more wounded. It is however one of the few instances in the 19th century of an Asian power defeating a Western one.  Wikipedia

Petraeus, Kilcullen, and OBL

KNOWING THE ENEMY
Can social scientists redefine the “war on terror”?
by George Packer New Yorker

Just before the 2004 American elections, Kilcullen was doing intelligence work for the Australian government, sifting through Osama bin Laden’s public statements, including transcripts of a video that offered a list of grievances against America: Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, global warming. The last item brought Kilcullen up short. “I thought, Hang on! What kind of jihadist are you?” he recalled. The odd inclusion of environmentalist rhetoric, he said, made clear that “this wasn’t a list of genuine grievances. This was an Al Qaeda information strategy.” Ron Suskind, in his book “The One Percent Doctrine,” claims that analysts at the C.I.A. watched a similar video, released in 2004, and concluded that “bin Laden’s message was clearly designed to assist the President’s reëlection.” Bin Laden shrewdly created an implicit association between Al Qaeda and the Democratic Party, for he had come to feel that Bush’s strategy in the war on terror was sustaining his own global importance. Indeed, in the years after September 11th Al Qaeda’s core leadership had become a propaganda hub. “If bin Laden didn’t have access to global media, satellite communications, and the Internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave,” Kilcullen said.

David Kilcullen, Ph.D. (born 1967) is a leading contemporary practitioner and theorist of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. A former Australian Army officer, he left the Army as a Lieutenant Colonel in 2005 and is now a senior civil servant, seconded to the United States State Department. He is currently serving as Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser, Multi-National Force - Iraq, a civilian position on the personal staff of American General David Howell Petraeus. wiki

++Playing into Bin Laden's hand
" analysts at the C.I.A. watched a similar video, released in 2004, and concluded that “bin Laden’s message was clearly designed to assist the President’s reëlection.” Bin Laden shrewdly created an implicit association between Al Qaeda and the Democratic Party, for he had come to feel that Bush’s strategy in the war on terror was sustaining his own global importance. Indeed, in the years after September 11th Al Qaeda’s core leadership had become a propaganda hub. “If bin Laden didn’t have access to global media, satellite communications, and the Internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave,” Kilcullen said."

To be blunt..

"Aside from its miserable record of extracting information, American security agencies shouldn't torture people because Osama bin Laden almost certainly want them to.



The strategists of al Qaeda reportedly took this theory a step further: they apparently noted that many of the Arab regimes they detested relied on American support, and concluded that if they provoked the Americans to kill, torture, and humiliate large numbers of Arabs and Muslims, the people of Arab counties that depended on American support would overthrow their own governments, and let al Qaeda allies in."

StoneWall

"Let us cross over the river and rest under the shade of the trees"

Antebellum

Antebellum
Originally uploaded by gustaf wallen

Slalom skiing on the Tigris at Baghdad.

Quote

The first rule is to keep an untroubled spirit. The second is to look things in the face and know them for what they are.
Marcus Aurelius